To achieve off-line delegation for mobile readers, we propose a delegation protocol for mobile RFID allowing its readers access to specific tags through back-end server. That is to say, reader-tag mutual authentication can be performed without readers being connected to back-end server. Readers are also allowed off-line access to tags' data. Compared with other delegation protocols, our scheme uniquely enables back-end server to limit each reader's reading times during delegation. Even in a multireader situation, our protocol can limit reading times and reading time periods for each of them and therefore makes back-end server's delegation more flexible. Besides, our protocol can prevent authorized readers from transferring their authority to the unauthorized, declining invalid access to tags. Our scheme is proved viable and secure with GNY logic; it is against certain security threats, such as replay attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, counterfeit tags, and breaches of location and data privacy. Also, the performance analysis of our protocol proves that current tags can afford the computation load required in this scheme.
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AS (authentication server)
ONS (object name server)
OIS (object information server) (1) (2)
Database Tag Mobile reader Mobile RFID's authentication requires that a reader access a tag and verify the tag's returned messages through back-end server [9] [10] [11] . However, interruption of the authentication happens due to unstable network connection or moving of the reader. For this reason, off-line delegation schemes [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] have been developed in recent years allowing a reader partial authority, so that it can verify a tag's messages directly. Lee and Li [15] use a time stamp for access control and multireading issue, and solve the problem that a tag may be accessed by several delegated readers at the same time. However, Lee's scheme cannot limit each reader's reading times. Further, in this protocol, an authorized reader may transfer the delegation authority to unauthorized readers without permission, allowing unauthorized readers to access the tag. Besides, malicious users can modify the time stamp sent from a reader, so that the time stamp that a tag receives is superior to the tag's. Then the tag sends to the reader a request for updating keys. Receiving the request, the reader sends it back to back-end server to renew the tag's keys and to generate a new delegation table for the reader. When receiving the new delegation table, the reader updates its table and the tag's information and sends the information to the tag. Following these, the tag checks the time stamp first and therefore will not renew the key. As a result, authorized readers are not able to access the tag.
In Fouladgar's delegation protocol [14] , he adds random numbers to messages and makes the attackers unable to use the intercepted data to carry out replay attacks because they do not have the required facilities to convert the data. Neither can the attackers launch Man-in-the-Middle attacks by generating any valid messages for tags or readers. Thus, the system will not get paralyzed because of the asynchrony between readers and tags. Besides, Fouladgar uses a counter to limit a reader's delegation and reading times. However, when a reader sends a query to a tag, the tag does not verify the query. If attackers keep sending queries to a tag, the tag's counter increases, which unfortunately decreases an authorized reader's opportunities for delegation and reading. When the counter reaches a limit, the reader can no longer access the tag and renew its keys. Meanwhile, if a legitimate tag renews its key at this moment, even the original reader is not able to access the tag. Hence, this protocol does not apply to a multi-reader situation or to mobile RFID networks. Since Dimitrou's delegation protocol [16] is designated for mobile readers, it can be applied in a mobile RFID environment. However, back-end server's authority delegation to readers is not automated and consequently causes some troubles when the server tries to delegate several readers at a time. Also, this scheme does not set any reading limits for readers.
Delegation protocols mentioned above do not completely apply to mobile readers and fail to prevent readers from transferring delegation messages to unauthorized readers. Also, when delegating multireaders simultaneously, these protocols have no control over each reading in spite of the limitation of reading times. As a result, one reader may read too many times and put other readers at a disadvantage. To deal with authorized readers' fair reading and mobile readers' authentication issues, we propose a delegation protocol that can be applied in a mobile RFID and multi-reader environment, allowing multireaders to perform mutual authentication through back-end server and to get access to specific tags. We limit each reader's reading times according to its authority and, further, restrict its reading time periods (how long it can read). When delegation expires or authorized readers transfer delegation messages to the unauthorized, readers' access to a tag will be declined. Moreover, our protocol can secure against certain security threats, such as replay attacks, DDoS attacks, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, counterfeit tags, and breaches of location privacy.
Section 2 deals with our off-line delegation protocol and details how to delegate a reader group and to limit each reader's reading times. Section 3 presents the security analysis of our protocol and compares it with that of other related schemes. Conclusion is drawn in Section 4.
Delegation Protocol with Limits on Reading Times
When a mobile reader is in an off-line access situation, we try to limit its reading times. Hence, we propose a protocol that is capable of delegation and off-line authentication in a mobile RFID network. As Figure 2 illustrates, back-end server delegates multireaders, and then the readers can read the tags even when they are not connected to the server. Thus, during the off-line access, readers do not need to connect back-end server to identify the tags. They simply can achieve mutual authentication with the tags in an off-line situation. In addition, in our protocol, one reader's reading times of a specific tag will not be influenced by other readers' reading of it. As shown in Figure 2 , because back-end server and readers have better computation, communication between the server and delegated readers RID 1 , RID 2 , . . . , RID j can be encrypted with AES [17] or 3-DES. For this reason, we assume that the channel between back-end server and readers is secured and use the channel for delegation, so as to acquire a tag's access and reading times. After delegation, reader RID 1 and tags TID 1 , TID 2 are able to do off-line authentication, and the reader can even access the tags' data through an insecure channel now, as shown in Figure 2 (b). Readers RID 3 and RID 11 also use this channel to access tags TID 2 , TID 3 , and TID 5 .
Our protocol consists of three phases. Phase 1 is initialization, that is, preliminary work for tags, readers, and backend server. Phase 2 deals with the body of our delegation protocol, how back-end server delegates a group of readers. Phase 3 is about off-line authentication, explaining how we limit readers' reading times in an off-line situation and how we allow them off-line access to tags.
Phase 1. Initialization.
In order for tags and readers to recognize each other when doing off-line authentication of tags, tags should be able to compute hash and generate random numbers, and there must be enough storage for the access control list (ACL) that has the access to the tag. In addition, during initialization, each tag TID i is supposed to have its time stamp TS i to check if the delegated readers have expired, whose initial state TS i = 0 indicates that all the legitimately authorized readers can read the tag. Also, the tag TID i has to share two secret keys with the back-end database. Because the length of hash chains [18] can be unlimited, our protocol does not take it into consideration that keys will run out. Hence, after initialization, tags have an empty ACL Rlist i , which stores the information including each reader's number, reading times, and the allowed maximum reading times. For example, when an unauthorized reader tries to access tag TID 2 , Rlist 2 contains no information, as shown in Table 1 
indicates the reading times that RID j is allowed (by back-end database) to read the tag TID i . As readers have not read tags yet after initialization, thus RC i j = 0. The next section will deal with the protocol we propose that which allows back-end database to delegate the access to readers, so that readers are authorized to read and identify tags.
Phase 2. Delegation Protocol.
In the mutual authentication protocol between tags and readers, we propose, they need to authenticate each other without back-end database and only the authorized readers can access the tag. For this reason, we require that readers be delegated directly by backend database ( Figure 3 ).
When RID j fails to obtain the delegation table or the table is invalid, the reader will send Request Table to backend database for it. Receiving the request, back-end database 
The formula RK Figure 4 , our protocol will run the hash function H() n times along the x-axis, generating n time stamps. Likewise, it will run the hash function G() p times along the y-axis and come to 
. Further, we combine the two parts and then find the key MaxTC i j when reader RID j reads the tag TID i for the maximum times p. In Figure 4 , when time stamp RS i = 1, back-end database uses the hash functions H() and G() to obtain the session key
⊕ RID j )) when the reader reads the tag TID i for the first time. Besides, backend database, according to the maximum reading times p, will also run the hash function G() p times to generate the key MaxRK
when the reader reads the tag for the maximum times.
After generating the session key, back-end database begins to create a delegation table for readers ( the session key stored on the reader will then be updated as RK
. TID 3 and TID 5 will generate session keys in the same way.
After receiving the delegation table from back-end database, reader RID 11 is able to read tags TID 2 , TID 3 , and TID 5 and then check the validity of the messages that the tags return. Meanwhile, the reader's time stamp that we propose is delegated by back-end database, and TID 2 's TS 2 is therefore updated by the reader. Once the reader reads the tag, its time stamp will synchronize with back-end database. If the tag's TS 2 = 5, only when the reader's RS 2 = 5 can the reader read this tag; if one of the readers is in the state that RS 2 = 6, the tag will test the reader and update the tag to TS 2 = 6 (no matter whether the reading times reach the maximum). RID 11 's delegation table is then generated according to the setting of back-end database, allowing the reader to read the tag in compliance with its delegated power. The detailed approach and what information is used by backend database to control the reading times will be discussed in Section 3. We use the notations summarized in Table 3 to help illustrate the protocol throughout this paper.
Phase 3. Off-Line Mutual Authentication Protocol.
After acquiring the delegation table through the delegation protocol, readers are capable of off-line reading of tags and able to limit the reading times in accordance with the delegation table from back-end database. When reader RID j tries to read the tag TID i that has been authorized access by backend database, mutual authentication (based on the protocol of tag's off-line authentication as shown in Figure 5 ) must be done first and then RID j has to confirm its reading times. If the reading times are below back-end database's limitation, RID j is allowed to read and identify the tag. The detailed protocol and steps are as follows.
Step 1. When reading the tag, reader RID j also sends out Request, its own ID (RID j ), and the random number r 0 to the tag. Receiving the Request message, tag TID i uses its own secret key TK cur i , itself, and RID j to generate the tag's shared secret (SignRT i r 0 r 1 ) with SignRT i as well as random numbers r 0 and r 1 using operator " " to concatenate them as a string, so that RID j is able to use that information to identify the tag that it is reading. RID j is included in the secret key to keep the unauthorized readers from acquiring SignRT i and then reading the tag.
Step Figure 5 : Off-line mutual authentication protocol. Table 7 Initial steps Tag Table 8 Goal
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The reader authenticates the tag with SignRT i , whereas the tag authenticates the reader with RK i j , hence mutual authentication. Then, the tag acquires the reader's maximum reading times P. Since the authentication is confirmed, the update of RK 
sending M 3 , TC r 1 ) , so that the tag can know that the reader has updated the key and counter. Receiving M 4 and URC from RID j , the tag then updates its counter TC i j . If the result of authentication is negative, RID j will generate random numbers to create M 4 and URC to prevent guessing attacks.
Step 5. Receiving the message in Step 4, RID j gets RC For example, when receiving the delegation table from back-end database, reader RID 11 will send to the tag Request, the reader RID 11 = 11, and the random number of this session r 0 = 777. As the tag receives all the information, it first generates a random number r 1 = 558 and then takes its secret key TK cur 2 = 4321, its own ID TID 2 = 52, and the received RID 11 to generate the shared secret SignRT 2 = H(4321 ⊕ 52 ⊕ 11). Following this, the tag uses the shared secret and the two random numbers 777 and 558 to generate M 1 = G(SignRT 2 777 558) and subsequently returns M 1 and r 1 to RID 11 .
Step 2. RID 11 adopts the two random numbers 777 and 558 and the shared secret SignRT 2 from the delegation table to generate M 1 = G(SignRT 2 777 558) and then compares it with M 1 to check its validity. If the result is positive, RID 11 can therefore confirm that the tag is TID 2 . Also, the reader will take from the delegation table TID 2 's corresponding counter RC Step 3. RID 11 takes RS 2 and RC 2 11 to check the validity of M 2 . If the outcome is positive, we will deal with the following three situations according to the tag's time stamp and ACL. Table 3 indicates the change of the tag's Rlist 2 and the corresponding responses of the reader and the tag.
Situation 1.
If received RS 2 = 1 and bigger than the tag's TS 2 = 0 and RC 2 11 = 0, the tag's time stamp is no longer valid and needs to synchronize with the system. Thus, TS 2 = RS 2 , and the tag will clear Rlist 2 because the reader Table 9 Delegation
After receiving a reader's Request and its ID RID j , back-end database will generate the information for the reader to access the tag. This part is done through a secured channel, so this information can be transferred directly to the reader, and the reader will take it without further checking, hence RS i , RC Besides, according to the results above, whether tag TID 2 is going to send messages depends on the validity of received messages. If the validity is confirmed, TID 2 will generate legitimate M 3 , and URK to update the session key and the reader's counter. If not, it will generate TC 2 11 , M 3 , and URK with random numbers.
Step 4. The reader will check if TC 2 11 is the same as RC 2 11 and then take RK 2 11 , URK and random numbers 777 and 558 to generate M 3 so as to check the validity of M 3 . If the result is positive, it will update the session key RK 2 11 and its counter RC 2 11 . It will subsequently generate M 4 , and URC so that the tag can update its counter simultaneously.
Step 5. If the received value of RC 2 11 is one more than that of TC 2 11 and M 4 is confirmed as valid, TC 2 11 will then be updated.
Security Analysis
This section deals with the security analysis of our protocol, especially in terms of off-line authentication in the prevention of replay attack, DDoS, Man-in-the-Middle attack as well as counterfeit tag, and the protection of tag owner's data and location privacy.
Prevention of Replay Attack.
In replay attacks, attackers usually acquire valid messages in the communications and then resend those messages to tags or readers. Nonetheless, due to the random numbers r 0 and r 1 in every session in our protocol, which every message adopts in every session, all the messages are therefore ever changing. Hence, attacks will Table 10 Off-line authentication of tag
T r 0
T RID j
After receiving RID j and r 0 , the tag can identify this reader and know the random numbers in this session.
The reader can identify the tag because of SignRT i from back-end database. Since both the reader and tag have SignRT i , the reader can then check the validity of message M 1 and trust the received messages.
Since the tag has been authenticated by the reader, it will generate RK i j with received RS i and RC i j , authenticate M 2 with RK i j , and then allow itself to authenticate the reader. Besides, it will acquire with MaxR the maximum reading times P from back-end database.
After identifying the tag, the reader generates a new RK fail to resend any messages when users are off line, despite their successful interception. Even though the message in
Step 1 is intercepted and resent, attackers will obtain no valid information from it. The tag's returned message M 1 contains random numbers r 0 and r 1 , and attackers do not have the valid shared secret, so we can say that replay attacks do not post any threats in this step.
Prevention of DDoS.
In our protocol, because the reader does not need to update its session keys via back-end database, failed reading due to unsuccessful update of keys does not exist. Besides, if the tag does not receive the message to update its counter in Step 4, it will synchronize its counter in Step 3 in the next session when read by the same reader for authentication. Thus, the reader is still able to recognize the message it has sent in spite of the asynchronous counters. Failed reading is avoided again.
Prevention of Man-in-the-Middle Attack.
Man-in-themiddle attacks alter or resend the message that the tag returns or the reader sends when trying to pretend as valid tags or readers. Our protocol uses M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , and M 4 to check the alteration of messages and to identify resent messages with random numbers so as to prevent Man-in-the-middle attacks. When these attacks try to pretend as valid readers or tags, they are unable to fake valid messages for authentication and then fail.
Constrained Delegation.
In our protocol, a reader can authenticate a tag with a shared secret SignRT i and, on the other hand, a tag can check the validity of a reader with the message M 2 sent by a reader in Step 2, hence mutual authentication. Since the delegation table that a reader receives contains the reader's identity, the authorized reader cannot delegate other readers. Even though acquiring the information, they will not pass the mutual authentication scheme.
Protection of Location Privacy.
Due to the random numbers in all the messages between a tag and a reader in every session and the protection of the messages by their secret keys, hackers are unable to identify a tag's number despite their successful interception of the messages in our protocol. In addition, attacks are unable to decide whether two messages are sent by the same tag, for they do not have a clue about the relation between the two messages sent by one tag in different sessions. Thus, attackers cannot locate the tag from the messages they intercept.
Privacy of Data.
As attacks, such as replay attack and Man-in-the-Middle attack, cannot pass our authentication, they are not able to access the tag without the authorization from back-end database. The privacy of data is therefore secured. are values set for a pair of tag and reader. As a result, when RID j accesses TID i , the reading times of the rest of readers will not be influenced in the same environment.
Limitation of Reading
Comparison with Other Relevant Authentication Approaches.
After analyzing the security issues discussed above, we then compare our protocol with other off-line authentication approaches designed in recent years. As shown in Table 4 , our protocol is able to prevent more attacks than others.
In Table 4 , we find the approaches [14] [15] [16] are not able to work in a multi-reader or mobile RFID environment or to limit each reader's reading times, despite their offline authentication designs. Lee's protocol [15] can prevent replay attacks, but not Man-in-the-Middle attacks and DDoS caused by Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Its tags cannot identify readers either. Our protocol, however, can meet all these requirements and is compatible with the environments mentioned above. Table 5 , we analyze the computation of our protocol and compare it with that of other protocols. We only analyze the high-complexity computing functions in the table. RL represents the number of delegated tags in a reader; TL represents the number of authorized readers in a tag; c represents a reader's reading times; T H represents the time to run a hash.
Performance. In
In Lee's protocol [15] , if the reader's time stamp is different from the tag's and the tag has not been read for a while, the tag's computation will increase remarkably for the gap of time between TS and RS, whereas the computation in our protocol will not increase for the factor of time. Moreover, Fouladgar and Afifi [14] and Dimitrou [16] though need only one hash computation, They are consequently not able to make mutual authentication between a reader and tag. They cannot even tell which reader is accessing the tag or prevent the authorized reader from delegating other readers. Our tag needs two encryption, and therefore the required gate counts are fewer than 4000 [19] , still within EPC Class 1 Gen2's permitted range 5000 [20] . Besides, the value of n is usually rather low, say 10 or 20, and it makes our protocol viable even on a low cost RFID tag.
Proof of Security.
Here, we use GNY logic [21] to prove our protocol. As back-end database and a reader are communicating through a secured channel, we only discuss the delegation messages exchanged between backend database and a reader and the information that backend database delegates to a reader. Further, in the protocol of off-line authentication of tags, we analyze, step by step, the messages in each session and their shared information.
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Our protocol sends the delegation message from backend database to the reader first, so that the reader can directly access the tag. Therefore, when the reader updates RC i j and RK i j , back-end database will not be involved. In order to limit the reader's reading times, we acquire it from P in T MaxRK 
Conclusion
With the rapid development of technology and RFID techniques, fixed readers have been turned into mobile ones. Through the combination of reading chips and mobile devices (e.g., PDA and cell phones), people have constructed a mobile RFID environment. However, as the communication of RFID is via radio wave and the readers of mobile RFID are portable, readers are no longer confined by space, and therefore attacks are more easily to carry out. Besides, most current RFID authentication protocols need to examine the messages and require that the reader connect back-end database for mutual authentication between the reader and tag. Such approaches will be confined by the accessibility of wireless networks. Therefore, we propose a delegation protocol for mobile RFID networks. It allows the reader to do off-line mutual authentication and then access the tag. In addition, the off-line delegation protocol that we propose is able to limit each reader's reading time and times when multi-readers are delegated to access the same tag. Thus, after the delegation from back-end database, each reader's reading time and times can be limited according to its time stamp and counter. Moreover, we use GNY to prove that our protocol is able to prevent the authorized readers from delegating unauthorized ones. Therefore, our protocol is capable of the prevention of attacks such as replay attack, DDoS, Man-inthe-Middle attack, and counterfeit tag, and of the protection of data privacy and location privacy. Last but not least, our protocol applies in EPC Class Gen2.
